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Comment
Awarding Fair Compensation To
Bankruptcy Trustees
For almost a century, bankruptcy trustees have argued with courts
regarding appropriate compensation. In 1899, a trustee petitioned
the court for a lump sum in lieu of the 3 percent commission al-
lowed under the 1898 Bankruptcy Act.' The court held that "the 3
percent commission was ample compensation for all the services
performed, and it was the only type of compensation allowed
under the [A]ct. "'2 In 1986, a trustee submitted a fee application
to the court based upon the maximum statutory amount allowed
under the 1978 Bankruptcy Code.' The bankruptcy court reduced
the fee.4 On appeal, the district court affirmed the award conclud-
ing there was no abuse of discretion in the fee reduction.5
I. THE PROBLEM
The filing of a bankruptcy petition creates an estate.6 A bank-
ruptcy trustee represents the estate in Chapter 7 liquidation cases.7
The "debtor in possession" represents the estate in Chapter 11 reor-
1. In re Carolina Cooperage Co., 96 F. 950, 951 (E.D.N.C. 1899).
2. Id. at 952.
3. In re Roco Corp., 64 Bankr. 499, 501 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1986).
4. Id. at 501. The trustee submitted an application for a fee of $3990. Id. at 501
n.2. The bankruptcy court awarded $3000. The trustee asserted that he was entitled to
the maximum award under section 326 of the Code. Id. at 502. The District Court noted
that if section 326(a) was meant "as a grant to trustees rather than a mere ceiling on
fees, there would have been little need for Congress providing separate standards in
330(a)." Id. Further, the bankruptcy judge treated the application conservatively be-
cause the trustee failed to provide adequate records on how his time was spent. Id. at
504. It should be noted that inadequately prepared fee applications contribute to the
courts already difficult task of determining the reasonableness of a trustees fees. ' -
5. Id. at 505.
6. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a) (1990).
7. Id. § 701.
ganization cases unless a trustee is appointed. 8 The trustee collects
estate property and reduces it to money.9 The money collected is dis-
bursed to creditors and the estate is closed as expeditiously as possi-
ble."0 Because the trustee is employed to further the interests of the
estate, estate funds are used to compensate the trustee."
The trustee is a commissioned person. 12 This scheme of compensa-
tion works to maximize the advantage of creditors, because it pro-
vides a strong incentive for trustees to collect as many of the estate's
assets as possible. However, in most liquidation cases, there are few
or no assets to collect. As a result, the trustee is inadequately com-
pensated for work performed. 13 Furthermore, the value of a trustee
does not lie solely in the ability to collect and distribute the estate.
In reorganization cases, for example, much of the trustee's value to
creditors, employees, and the economic system depends upon busi-
ness savvy and expertise.' 4
In the bankruptcy arena, the problem of awarding fees plagues
both the trustee and the bench. Although the Bankruptcy Code",
8. Id. § 1104.
9. This is primarily true in a Chapter 7 liquidation case. 11 U.S.C. § 704 (1990).
In Chapter 11 reorganizations, the trustee may operate the business rather than liquidate
depending upon the plan. Id. § 1106.
10. 11 U.S.C. § 704 (1990).
11. Id.; see infra note 36 for relevant text of statute.
12. 11 U.S.C. § 326(a) (1990); see infra note 20.
13. 11 U.S.C. § 330(b) (1990) provides the trustee with a $45 fee in no asset
cases.
14. A fundamental premise of bankruptcy law is "to encourage and facilitate reha-
bilitation of businesses in financial trouble. Rehabilitation of a business is considered
better for the economy because it minimizes employment and waste of business assets."
B. WEINTRAUB & A. RESNICK, BANKRUPTCY LAW MANUAL, § 8.02 (1980). Individuals
also may file Chapter .11 in order to retain more than exempt assets. H. NOVIKOFF,
CHAPTER 11 BUSINESS REORGANIZATIONS 23 (1989).
Choosing between a Chapter 7 liquidation and a Chapter 11 reorganization depends
upon which course offers the greatest opportunity for the total dollar return on the assets.
Choosing a Chapter 11 means that the reorganized firm is better for its creditors as a
going concern rather than liquidating the assets. T. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LINITs OF
BANKRUPTCY LAW 5 (1986). "Administration of a chapter 11 case requires decision
about the use of business assets and opportunities." Nimmer & Feinberg, Chapter 11
Business Governance: Fiduciary Duties, Business Judgment, Trustees and Exclusivity, 6
BANKR. DEv. J. 1, 4 (1986).
However, the financial opportunities will rarely present themselves with clarity because
"most chapter 11 cases entail factual uncertainty, financial distress and explicitly con-
flicting interests." Id. at 1. Successful reorganization depends upon a great deal of "crea-
tive, imaginative and high quality work." See Lavien, Fees as Seen from the Bankruptcy
Bench, 89 COM. L.J. 136 (1984). Thus, reorganization cases need trustees who have sub-
stantial executive abilities and business "know how" in order to ensure their success.
Under section 326(a) a trustee's compensation in a Chapter 11 case is based upon the
same statutory maximums as in a Chapter 7 liquidation case. However, "the maximums
may be too limited to attract a trustee in a case which requires substantial executive
abilities." 2 W. COLLIER, COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 326.01 (L. King 15th ed. 1990).
Consequently, financial considerations may hamper trustee appointments in reorganiza-
tion. Id.
15. The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 was signed into law on November 6,
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provides statutory guidelines for awarding compensation to trust-
ees,16 the amount ultimately decided upon has always been vested in
the court.'7 The court must apply the Code's complicated scheme of
compensation to a variety of factual situations. The resulting prob-
lem is that sometimes only slight variations in the facts result in dis-
parate outcomes.
Trustee fees are subject to two limitations under the Bankruptcy
Code. Section 330(a)(1) provides that the court may award reasona-
ble compensation.' 8 To qualify for compensation under this section,
services must be necessary and beneficial to the estate. Section
326(a) fixes the maximum compensation allowed based upon the
amount of moneys disbursed. 19 Determining trustee compensation
according to these two distinct standards creates a vexing problem
for the bankruptcy judge. For example, a fee of $70,000 might be
reasonable under the standards of section 330(a)(1), however, sec-
tion 326(a) might place a $60,000 cap on compensation. Similarly,
the reasonable value of the trustee's services becomes irrelevant
under section 326(a) if little or no money is disbursed. In either case,
the trustee may be denied compensation for valuable services per-
formed, resulting in a windfall to the estate.
The legislative history of these two sections of the Code further
1978 and is commonly referred to as the "Code". The Code replaces the entire Bank-
ruptcy Act of 1898. A. PASKAY, HANDBOOK FOR TRUSTEES AND RECEIVERS IN BANK-
RUPTCY 2 (Supp. 1979).
16. 11 U.S.C. §§ 330 (a)(1), 326(a) (1990).
17. "(a) In a case under chapter 7 or 11, the court may allow reasonable compen-
sation under section 330 of [the Code] . . . for the trustee's services .... ." 11 U.S.C. §
326(a) (1990) (emphasis added).
18. 11 U.S.C. § 330(a)(1) (1990).
(a) After notice to any parties in interest ... and subject to section 326, .
the court may award to a trustee, ...
(1) reasonable compensation for actual, necessary services rendered by
such trustee, . . . based on the nature, the extent, and the value of such
services, the time spent on such services, and the cost of comparable ser-
vices other than in a case under this title;
Id.
19. 11 U.S.C. § 326(a) (1990).
(a) In a case under chapter 7 or 11, the court may allow reasonable compensa-
tion under section 330 of this title for the trustee's services, payable after the
trustee renders such services, not to exceed fifteen percent on the first $1000 or
less, six percent on any amount in excess of $1000 but not in excess of $3000,
and three percent on any amount in excess of $3000, upon all moneys dis-
bursed or turned over in the case by the trustee to parties in interest, excluding
the debtor, but including holders of secured claims.
Id.
exacerbates the problem. Congressional intent behind section
330(a)(1) indicates that bankruptcy courts should award trustee fees
"at the same rate that would be used to compensate them for per-
forming comparable services in nonbankruptcy cases."20 The legisla-
tive movement away from the notion of strict economy,2 pervasive
under the Bankruptcy Act, demonstrates Congress' recognition that
trustees would leave the bankruptcy field if they could earn more
substantial compensation in other areas.2 2 If bankruptcy specialists
left the field, less qualified individuals would administer cases. Credi-
tors would pay the "costs of improper and inefficient administra-
tion."23 This "new marketplace approach ' 24 reflects a realization
that effective estate administration cannot be accomplished cost free.
Nonetheless, Congressional intent that trustees be awarded com-
petitive fees is incompatible with the statutory limitations under sec-
tion 326(a). When competitive fees exceed the maximums they are
not allowed. In addition, competitive fees are disallowed when no
funds are disbursed or turned over to creditors despite beneficial ser-
vices performed on behalf of the estate.
Legislative history also suggests that the statutory maximums
under section 326(a) are not entitlements as a matter of right, but
are to be regarded by the courts as outer limits on the value of a
trustee's services.25 One court noted that "the maximum [limitation]
really has no correlation with fair value for services."2 The maxi-
mum correlates to moneys disbursed. However, the court must still
consider the reasonableness of the fee under the separate standards
of section 330(a)(1).
Congressional intent behind section 326(a) that the trustee is not
entitled to the statutory maximum despite eligibility is irreconcilable
with the structure of the statutory commission scheme. Under this
approach, a trustee may never achieve the maximum even though
substantial moneys are disbursed. Hence, the original intent of the
commission scheme is frustrated because trustee incentive to collect
and preserve assets for the estate is diminished.
Moreover, because section 326(a) does not limit the compensation
of other professionals, meagerly paid trustees may overuse profes-
sionals or paraprofessionals, making case administration more expen-
20. 124 CONG. REc. HII,091-92 (Sept. 28, 1978); 124 CONG. REC. S17,408 (Oct.
6, 1978)), reprinted in 2 W. COLLIER, supra note 14, 11 330.03.
21. See infra notes 41-44 and accompanying text.
22. 2 W. COLLIER, supra note 14, 1 330.05(2)(e).
23. Id.
24. In re Roco Corp., 64 Bankr. 499, 504 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1986) (citing In re Casco
Bay Lines, Inc., 25 Bankr. 747 at 753-54 (Bankr. 1st Cir. 1982)).
25. H.R. REP. No. 95-595, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 327 (1977).
26. In re Garland Corp., 8 Bankr. 826, 833 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1981).
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sive under the current statutory scheme .2  As a result, creditor re-
turns are decreased. It is evident that the current statutory scheme is
ineffectual in encouraging efficient case administration.
Not surprisingly, courts are presented with a difficult task when
awarding fees. The results depict how the conflicting standards cause
uncertainties and inequities in the area of trustee compensation.
Moreover, disparate outcomes in the cases illustrate the unpredict-
ability of the statutory scheme from the trustee's point of view.28
This Comment explores the differing judicial approaches to the
problem of awarding fair compensation to trustees. In order to illus-
trate the ineffectiveness of the current statutory scheme various situ-
ations are discussed. All relate to a single question: does the statu-
tory limitation tied to property distribution actually serve to promote
efficient case administration under the Code? It seems anomalous for
Congress to intend that trustees be compensated according to the
standards set forth under section 330(a)(1) and simultaneously con-
dition their compensation upon the distribution of the moneys from
the estate.
II. BACKGROUND OF BANKRUPTCY LAW
A. Interaction between the Goals of Bankruptcy and
Compensation of Trustees
The two goals of bankruptcy law are: 1) The rehabilitation of
overburdened debtors, often called the "fresh start" policy, and 2)
equitable treatment of creditors. 9 The fresh start policy applies only
to individual debtors.30 In accord with this policy, individual debtors
are granted the right to discharge their debts, which allows them to
keep a shirt on their backs, and to stay off the welfare rolls.3"
When firms are involved, "bankruptcy law provide[s] creditors
27. See In re Marsh, 5 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d (MB) 106, 110 (Bankr. E.D. Va.
1981) (After reviewing expense reports turned in by the trustee, the judge noted that
"[w]e may well learn that section 330 encourages too much professional or paraprofes-
sional help and the riding of expenses to death.").
28. A trustee is placed in a position of financial uncertainty when he agrees to
administer a bankruptcy case. The trustee will not receive reasonable compensation for
valuable services if no moneys are disbursed. Likewise, if moneys are disbursed the trus-
tee may still be denied reasonable compensation at competitive rates when his fee is
capped under section 326(a).
29. T. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 4 (1986).
30. Id. at 225; see also 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(1) ("The court shall grant the debtor a
discharge, unless - 1) the debtor is not an individual ...
31. T. JACKSON, supra note 29, at 231.
with a compulsory and collective forum to sort out their relative enti-
tlements to a debtor's assets. ' 32 The goal of bankruptcy in this re-
gard is to apportion losses among the debtor's creditors in such a
way that losses to creditors as a group are reduced.33 Such reduction
occurs because without bankruptcy, creditors resort to individual
remedies which are costly and afford little opportunity for returns.34
In addition, the debtors may lose everything if not given the chance
to reorganize their business or, in the cases of individuals, the right
to discharge their debts.
However, the bankruptcy system does not dispense with all eco-
nomic costs. Trustees and other officers3" of the estate are paid in
full as an administrative expense before distributions to other un-
secured claimants are made.3" This priority scheme decreases returns
to general unsecured creditors. Thus, compensating the trustee from
estate funds comes into direct conflict with the goal of maximizing
returns to creditors. Further, in solvency situations, returns to the
debtor are reduced.
Efficient case administration is essential to maximize creditor re-
turns as well as to increase returns to solvent debtors. Attracting
competent personnel to fulfill this objective was one goal of case ad-
ministration reform under the Code. Congress provided that all pro-
fessionals be paid competitive rates.37 Unfortunately, section 326(a),
by treating trustees as commissioned persons fails to compensate
trustees at a rate which is competitive with the rates other profes-
sionals receive.
32. Id. at 4.
33. Id. at 5.
34. "Since each creditor knows that it must beat out the others if it wants to be
paid in full, it will spend time monitoring Debtor and the other creditors-perhaps fre-
quently checking the courthouse records-to make sure that it will be no worse, than
second in the race (and therefore still be paid in full)." Id. at 16. "Each creditor has to
spend ... money just to stay in the race because if it does not, it is a virtual certainty
that the others will beat it to the payment punch." Id.
35. 11 U.S.C. § 330(a) (1990). Officers may include examiners, professional per-
sons and attorneys, and paraprofessionals employed by such officers.
36. Id. § 507(a). Section 507(a) reads in relevant part:(a) The following expenses and claims have priority in the following order:(1) First, administrative expenses allowed under section 503(b) of this
title.
Id.
Section 503(b) reads in relevant part:(b) After notice and a hearing, there shall be allowed administrative expenses,
* . .including -
I(A) the actual, necessary costs and expenses of preserving the estate,
including wages, salaries, or commissions for services rendered after the
commencement of the case;
11 U.S.C. § 503(b) (1990).
37. 124 CONG. REC. Hi1,091-92, supra note 20.
[VOL 27: 993, 1990] Fair Compensation
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
B. Trustee Compensation and Case Administration Before the
Code
Under the Bankruptcy Act, the trustee was compensated in a
manner similar to the current scheme.3" The private trustee played a
fundamental role in the administration of estates.3 9 The underlying
premise was simple: the trustee "collects the assets of the estate and
holds them in trust for the benefit of the debtor's creditors."40 The
prevailing standard controlling trustee compensation was "the spirit
of economy and it required that, when awarding compensation to
officers, the court consider as most significant factors the conversa-
tion of the estate and the return to creditors. 41 While courts recog-
nized the need for adequate compensation of trustees in order to en-
courage economical administration of bankruptcy estates, this
standard greatly constrained their attempt to provide adequate com-
pensation to the trustee.
Furthermore, the statutory scheme placed trustees in a situation
where they were required to take on work of a "contingent nature,
but receive compensation based on noncontingent conservative stan-
dards. 42 The trustee was literally placed in a catch 22 situation.4
Trustees collecting assets worth a substantial amount were awarded
compensation according to an economically conservative standard.
Likewise, if the case turned out to be a nominal or no asset case,
38. Bankruptcy Act, 70 Stat. 216, § 48(c) (1956) (codified as amended at 11
U.S.C. § 76 (1956)). Section 48(c) states in relevant part:
c. Trustees. The compensation of trustees for their services, payable after they
are rendered, shall be a fee of $10 for each estate, deposited with the clerk at
the time the petition is filed in each case ..
(1) Normal Administration. When the trustee does not conduct the busi-
ness of the bankrupt, such sum as the court may allow, but in no event to
exceed 10 per centum on the first $5000 or less, 6 per centum on moneys
in excess of $500 and not more than $1500, 3 per centum on moneys in
excess of $1500 and not more than $10,000, per centum on moneys in
excess of $25,000, upon all moneys disbursed or turned over by them to
any persons, including lienholders: Provided, however, That in any case,
after the trustee has paid all expenses of administration and has realized
upon all available assets, the maximum compensation allowable to him
hereunder does not exceed $150, the court may of its own motion allow
the trustee a fee which with the commissions, if any, paid or to be paid
him shall not exceed $150.
Id.
39. A. PASKAY, supra note 15, § 7.001, at 158.
40. H.R. REP., supra note 25, at 91.
41. 2 W. COLLIER, supra note 14, 1 330.02.
42. Anderson & Miller, New Rules for Compensation in Bankruptcy Proceedings,
86 Com. L. J. 79, 83 (1981).
43. Id. at 83.
little or nothing would be paid. Too often the "[e]mphasis on results,
while simultaneously emphasizing that fees in bankruptcy proceed-
ings should be less than paid in the private sector, discouraged the
aggressive pursuit of case administration. Creditors received limited
recoveries as a result."44
Appointment of the trustee created another problem area in case
administration under the Act. Theoretically, creditors were to nomi-
nate and supervise the trustee.45 The creditors "would serve without
compensation simply to protect their own interests. ' 46 In reality,
however, "creditors took little interest in pursuing a bankrupt debtor.
They are unwilling to throw good money after bad,"47 and "creditor
control in bankruptcy cases proved to be nothing more than a
myth.' 48 As a result, bankruptcy judges often appointed the trus-
tee.419 Moreover, "[s]ome judges viewed the power to appoint as an
opportunity to dispense patronage; and some judges expressed open
hostility toward a creditor's insistence to nominate and elect a
trustee. '50
Eventually, the courts' active role in trustee appointment, coupled
with the economically conservative compensation standards, forced
the development of an easy to apply rule. The "spirit of economy"
gave way to a new standard where the statutory maximums became
minimums.5 1 More often than not "[i]n all but the largest cases,
trustees receive[d] the maximum fee." 52 This practice sharply re-
duced returns to creditors.
Judges also had discretion to award a fee of up to $150 in cases
where the statute would have allowed $10.53 This discretionary fee
provided a strong incentive for trustees to "create" an estate where
one did not exist when the statutory ceiling placed on the trustee's
compensation would have been less than $150. Trustees would take
the debtor's car or pets to sell back to the debtor for a least $150.14
This procedure allowed trustees to collect that amount in fees. The
so called "nominal asset cases" provided little for the creditors while
compelling debtors to turn over assets.55 Actually, "creditors re-
ceived virtually nothing in nominal assets cases,"5 6 and debtors who
44. Id.
45. H.R. REP., supra note 25, at 91.




50. A. PASKAY, supra note 15, § 7.001 at 159.
51. H.R. REP., supra note 25, at 93.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 94.
55. Id. at 93.
56. Id.
1000
[VOL. 27: 993, 1990] Fair Compensation
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
were compelled to -repurchase necessary or sentimental personal
property were denied an opportunity for a financial "fresh start. '57 It
is no wonder that creditors and debtors viewed the bankruptcy sys-
tem as having evolved for the benefit of those administering it."8
C. Congress Responds: The Trustee System Today
1. Case Administrative Reform
Dividing the judicial and administrative roles of a bankruptcy
judge was a principal revision under the Code.59 A temporary United
States trustee system was established in 1978 that "shifted estate
administration supervision from the judge to the United States trus-
tee." 60 Because of its success, the United States trustee office became
permanent in 1986.61 This legislation reflects Congress' intent that
"administrative matters should be the United States trustee's respon-
sibility and the court's role should be limited to that of an arbiter of
disputes. '62
The United States trustee nominates private trustees to serve on a
panel.6 3 Immediately after the court enters an order for relief in
Chapter 7 cases, "the United States trustee appoints an interim trus-
tee from the private panel."'6 4 "Unsecured creditors may elect a
qualified trustee by a majority vote if creditors holding at least 20
percent of the amount of the outstanding unsecured claims call for
the election." 65 Creditors can elect trustees who are not on the
panel.66 However, creditors infrequently elect trustees because they
can seldom comply with the statutory criteria needed for an elec-
tion. 67 Thus, an interim trustee will normally act as trustee in Chap-
57. Id. at 94.
58. Id.
59. G. TREISTER, J. TROST, L. FORMAN, K. KLEE & R. LEVIN, FUNDAMENTALS OF
BANKRUPTCY LAW § 2.03(a)(1), at 85 (1988) [hereinafter TREISTER & TROST].
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 85-86.
63. Id. at 87; see 28 U.S.C. § 586(a)(I) (1990); 11 U.S.C. 1302(a) (1990).
64. TREISTER & TROST, supra note 59, § 2.03(a)(3), at 91; see 11 U.S.C. §
701(a)(1) (1990).
65. TREISTER & TROST, supra note 59, § 2.03 (a)(3), at 91; see 11 U.S.C. §
702(c)(1990).
66. TREISTER & TROST, supra note 59, § 2.03(a)(3), at 91.
67. Id. 11 U.S.C. § 702(c) (1990) states:
(a) A creditor may vote for a candidate for trustee only if such creditor-
(1) holds an allowable, undisputed, fixed, liquidated, unsecured claim of a
kind entitled to distribution...
(2) does not have an interest materially adverse, other than an equity in-
1001
ter 7 cases.68
If a private trustee chooses not to serve, a staff member represent-
ing the United States trustee acts as the trustee.6 Nonetheless, fi-
nancial restrictions preclude the United States trustee from serving
and "it is that Office's policy to find private trustees.170 Conse-
quently, the private trustee continues to play a central role in Chap-
ter 7 case administration.
The "debtor in possession" represents the estate in Chapter 11
cases, unless the court orders the United States trustee to appoint a
private trustee. 1 Unlike Chapter 7 cases, "[n]either the United
States trustee nor a staff member may serve in reorganization
cases."17 2 "The appointed Chapter 11 trustee need not be a member
of the panel."'7 3 Because Chapter 11 presumes the debtor will con-
tinue to run the business, appointment of a trustee is an extraordi-
nary remedy.74 However, "[a]lIthough the appointment of a trustee
continues to be viewed as extraordinary, the clear trend today is to-
ward a growing number of cases being brought to cause."17 1 Conse-
quently, private trustees are essential for the administration of both
liquidation and reorganization cases.
The United States trustee supervises all aspects of bankruptcy
case administration including trustees.7 6 One aspect of trustee super-
vision involves monitoring applications for compensation and reim-
bursement of expenses. 77 By taking an active role in case administra-
terest that is not substantial in relation to such creditor's interest as a
creditor, to the interest of creditors entitled to such distribution; and
(3) is not an insider.
68. TREISTER & TROST, supra note 59, § 2.03(a)(3), at 91; see 11 U.S.C. § 702(d)
(1990).
69. TREISTER & TROST, supra note 59, § 2.03(a)(1), at 87; see 11 U.S.C. §
701(a)(1) (1990).
70. TREISTER & TROST, supra note 59, § 2.03(a)(1), at 87.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 87, 89; see 11 U.S.C. § 1104(c) (1990) ("If the court orders the appoint-
ment of a trustee ..... the United States trustee, after consultation with the parties in
interest, shall appoint, subject to the court's approval, one disinterested person other than
the United States trustee to serve as trustee.").
73. TREISTER & TROST, supra note 59, § 2.03(a)(1), at 89.
74. In re General Oil Distributors, Inc., 42 Bankr. 402, 408 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y.
1984).
75. Nimmer & Feinberg, Chapter 11 Business Governance: Fiduciary Duties, Bus-
iness Judgment, Trustees and Exclusivity, 6 BANKR. DEV. J. 1, 57 (1989); see also 11
U.S.C. § 1104 (1990). Section 1104 states in relevant part:
(1) the court shall order the appointment of a trustee-
(a) for cause, including, fraud, dishonesty, incompetence, or gross mis-
management of the affairs of the debtor by current management, either
before or after the commencement of the case, or similar cause ....
Id.
76. TREISTER & TROST, supra note 59, § 2.03(a)(1), at 89; see 28 U.S.C. §
586(a)(3) (1990).
77. TREISTER & TROST, supra note 59, § 2.03(a)(1), at 89; see 28 U.S.C. §
586(a)(3)(A) (1990).
1002
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tion, "the United States trustee can prevent fraud, dishonesty and
overreaching in the bankruptcy system."78
2. Trustee Compensation Reform
The Code also made significant changes in the area of trustee
compensation. First, the $150 fee was eliminated.7 9 Trustee compen-
sation in Chapter 11 reorganization cases was another statutory
change. Under the Act, a reorganization trustee's pay "was equated
to that of an executive performing similar services for an entity of
like size and complexity." 80 However, the Code no longer permits
Chapter 11 trustees to receive "reasonable compensation based on
the value of services without regard to . . . maximum commissions"
prescribed by the Act."' Therefore, trustee compensation in both
Chapter 7 and Chapter 11 are subject to the same maximums under
section 326(a).82
Additionally, a court's determination of reasonable fees no longer
depends upon notions of strict economy. Congressional intent indi-
cates that "[n]otions of economy of the estate in fixing fees are out-
dated and have no place in the Bankruptcy Code."83 Courts should
take a marketplace approach and award trustee fees "at the same
rate that would be used to compensate them for performing compa-
rable services in nonbankruptcy cases."8' 4 Congress realized that
awarding competitive fees would attract more competent profession-
als to efficiently administer cases.85
Furthermore, Congress increased the statutory percentages under
section 326(a) allotting for increased costs of living. 86 At the same
time, however, Congress made it clear that the statutory maximums
did not correlate to the fair value of services.8" Trustees were not
entitled to the maximums as a matter of right. Regardless of the
expanded statutory percentages, section 326(a) compensates only for
money distribution. Thus, other beneficial and necessary services
78. T. Stanton, The United States Trustee System: A Time for Assessment, 90
Com. L. J. 90, 91 (1985).




83. 124 CONG. REC. H11,091-92, supra note 20.
84. Id.
85. 2 W. COLLIER, supra note 14, 330.05(2)(e).
86. 2 W. COLLIER, supra note 14, I 326.01(3). (The bases were doubled under the
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 and further increased under the 1984 amendments).
87. H.R. REP., supra note 25, at 327.
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may go uncompensated especially in nominal or no asset cases.
Consequently, the question remains not whether trustees are enti-
tled to a maximum fee as a matter of right, but whether they are
entitled to compensation for the fair value of their services as a mat-
ter of right.
3. The Practical Effects of Reform under the Code:
Sources of the Problem - Statutory Construction and
Congressional Intent
The statutory scheme for trustee compensation and the underlying
Congressional intent has undermined efforts to increase the overall
effectiveness of case administration under the Code. Section 326(a)
often restricts courts from awarding competitive compensation by
placing a cap on trustee compensation based on a percentage of
monies disbursed. In addition, more demands have been placed upon
trustees without a corresponding raise in pay? 8 For example,
"[i]ncreased recordkeeping and reporting requirements . . . make a
trustee's job more difficult and time consuming."89 At the same time,
"due to liberalized exemption schedules[,] almost every case is ren-
dered a no asset case, slashing trustee compensation by as much as
75 % on a per estate basis." 90 Not surprisingly, "more work for less
pay" has reduced the number of trustees serving on panels.9 1 As one
court noted, "[t]he trustee in bankruptcy, a modestly compensated
and beleaguered creature under the old Bankruptcy Act, has be-
come, under the new Bankruptcy Code, an endangered species."'9 2
D. Statutory Restraints: 326(a)
When a trustee's fee under section 330(a)(1) exceeds the statutory
maximum of section 326(a), the court cannot award the fee. The
trustee is denied compensation for beneficial and necessary services
even after assisting the court in the administration of its caseload.
Thus, section 326(a) undermines the Congressional intent that trust-
ees be awarded competitive fees.
To avoid harsh results, some courts allow compensation even
though the statutory requirement of disbursing moneys has not been
met. However, because there is no statutory authority permitting
compensation in these cases, the approach is utilized in very few sit-




92. Id. (It should be noted that the judge made this statement in 1981, three years
after the statutory percentages were increased under section 326(a) for the first time in
1978, and three years after Congress adopted the new marketplace approach under sec-
tion 330(a)(1)).
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uations. Consequently, that approach cannot be effective in further-
ing the Congressional intent to award competitive rates for valuable
and necessary services under section 330(a)(1). Thus, section 326(a)
frustrates efforts to attract competent personnel to the bankruptcy
area. Case administration suffers as a result.
E. Restraints imposed by Congressional Intent
A further restraint placed upon the court in awarding fees is Con-
gress' intent that statutory maximums under section 326(a) have no
correlation to the fair value of services. 93 Notwithstanding the com-
mission scheme, the court is instructed by Congress to determine the
reasonable value of the trustees services. The court's highly subjec-
tive analysis of "reasonableness" is incompatible with the commis-
sion scheme under section 326(a). That approach diminishes trustee
incentive to collect and preserve assets for the estate because the
commission scheme is not truly a commission scheme.
Consider, for example, a no asset case where the trustee collects
substantial assets for the estate qualifying for the maximum allowed.
The court subjectively adjusts amounts allowed under section 326(a)
to meet the requirements of section 330(a)(1). If the reasonable
value of a trustee's services is within the statutory amount allowed
under section 326(a), the court is authorized to award the fee which
may or may not be the maximum. In such a case, the statutory man-
date under section 330(a)(1) of awarding reasonable fees prevails.
Ironically, the court may not award the fee where the reasonable
value of a trustee's services exceeds the maximum. In this case, the
statutory mandate of awarding reasonable fees at competitive rates
under section 330(a)(1) gives way to the statutory mandate of sec-
tion 326(a), capping the fee despite what might otherwise be
reasonable.
Arguably, in bankruptcy cases, the commission scheme of section
326(a) no longer serves as an incentive for the trustee to diligently
locate assets to bring into the estate. This is because courts have
been instructed to award fees according to the "reasonable" stan-
dard under section 330(a)(1). The essence of the commission scheme
under section 326(a) is undermined when courts award "reasonable"
fees that are inconsistent with the amount of moneys distributed
from the estate. Therefore, section 326(a) discourages the aggressive
pursuit of case administration.
93. See supra note 25.
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III. THE DIFFERING JUDICIAL APPROACHES To THE PROBLEM OF
AWARDING FAIR COMPENSATION To TRUSTEES
A. Disregarding the Statutory Mandate that Moneys be
Disbursed: The Law of Natural Justice and Equity
A literal reading of section 326(a) suggests that a trustee is not
entitled to a statutory commission when no moneys are disbursed. In
spite of this, several courts avoid the statutory mandate and award
compensation to trustee's regardless of their failure to meet the re-
quirement that moneys be disbursed to the parties in interest. Bank-
ruptcy judges dislike denying compensation to trustees who have as-
sisted the court in administering caseloads. Accordingly, courts
exercise their equitable power to allow compensation on a quantum
meruit basis to those trustees who perform beneficial services for the
estate.
1. Cases that are not fully administered
One line of cases suggests that a literal reading of section 326(a)
reveals that the section only applies to fully administered cases. 4
Accordingly, "[i]n cases . . . not fully administered, through no
fault of the trustee, compensation should be awarded to the trustee
on a quantum meruit basis when the trustee performed substantial
services but did not disburse any moneys." 95 One court noted that in
these cases "debtors would enjoy the benefits of bankruptcy law cost
free if section 326(a) was always literally applied."9
For example, a debtor may convert a Chapter 7 filing to Chapter
13 "to avoid the consequences of a trustee's actions in locating, iden-
tifying and administering assets." 97 Upon conversion, the trustee's
duties end, therefore, preventing the trustee from fully administering
the case. Thus, literal application of section 326(a) precludes the
awarding of trustee fees regardless of work performed before conver-
sion because no moneys have been disbursed.
In In re Parameswaran, the trustee "created [an] asset case from
[a] no asset case" by discovering a fraudulent transfer of real prop-
94. In re Parameswaran, 64 Bankr. 341, 343 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986).
95. Id.
96. In re Rerinison, 13 Bankr. 951, 953 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1981).
97. In re Wells, 87 Bankr. 732, 736 n.3 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1988). The Chapter 7
trustee collects all nonexempt assets and reduces them to cash. The cash is disbursed to
creditors. In contrast, qualified individual debtors can pay all or part of their debts ac-
cording to a plan in Chapter 13 cases. "Chapter 13 is attractive to individual debtors
because it affords the most liberal discharge provision of any chapter under the Code."
H. LEBOWiTZ, BANKRUPTCY DESKBOOK 73 (2d ed. 1990). For example, "debtors making
fraudulent transfers will lose discharge rights under chapter 7 but still may be able to
discharge in chapter 13." Id. Further, only debtors can begin a Chapter 13 case or con-
vert a case from another Chapter to Chapter 13. Id. at 72.
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erty.98 After the trustee effectively barred the debtor's discharge and
retrieved the property for the estate, the debtor exercised his right to
convert the Chapter 7 case to Chapter 13. Consequently, "the trus-
tee was prevented from fully administering the Chapter 7 case." 99
Nonetheless, the court awarded a quantum meruit fee compensable
directly from the debtor's estate even though no moneys were dis-
bursed.100 Thus, the court rewarded the trustee's services and in-
volvement in the case.
Likewise, in In re Tweeten Funeral Home, the court awarded a
quantum meruit fee to the trustee when no moneys were disbursed to
creditors because of stipulation. 10 1 Commenced under Chapter 11,
the Tweeten case was converted to Chapter 7 when "[t]he four prin-
cipals of the funeral home filed separate Chapter 7 petitions. 10 2 The
appointed trustee began administering the separate cases but his du-
ties suddenly stopped when "the debtors, the trustee and other inter-
ested parties entered into an omnibus stipulation by which all admin-
istrative proceedings . . . and . . . claims were settled." 10 3 "No
funds came into the hands of the trustee" because the individual
debtors paid all unsecured claims themselves in accordance with the
stipulation.10 4 Because of the valuable services performed on behalf
of the estate, the court circumvented the requirements of section
326(a) and awarded a quantum meruit fee to the trustee.
2. Cases that are fully administered
Another line of cases allows for compensation even though the
statutory requirement of disbursing moneys has not been met.105 For
example, one court allowed fees in excess of the statutory limitations
under section 326(a) when funds were returned to the debtor after
the case was dismissed. 06 In In re Flying S Land & Cattle Co., Inc.,
98. Parameswaran, 64 Bankr. at 342-43. (Debtors have the right to convert under
11 U.S.C. § 706 (1990).
99. Parameswaran, 64 Bankr. at 343.
100. Id. But see In re Woodworth, 70 Bankr. 361 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1987)
(Debtor converted Chapter 7 to Chapter 13 but court denied compensation because "ef-
forts of trustee did not result in any marshalling of assets or disbursement of funds to
creditors." Id. at 363.).




105. A fully administered case is one where the trustee has fulfilled his duties and
is ready to disburse cash to the unsecured creditors.
106. See In re Flying S Land & Cattle Co., Inc., 23 Bankr. 56 (Bankr. C.D. Cal.
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"[t]he trustee resolved a [boundary] dispute between the debtor and
John Travolta who had purchased part of the debtor's property
before the bankruptcy proceedings." ' 7 Resolution of the dispute per-
mitted the trustee to prevent a foreclosure and sell the rest of the
property for $12 million.' The debtor requested dismissal of the
case after his problems were settled.109 Because the trustee had al-
ready reduced the property to cash, moneys held by the trustee were
returned to the debtor.
A literal reading of section 326(a) suggests that all disbursements
to debtors are excluded from consideration in computing a trustee's
commissions. The court held section 326(a) inapplicable "when
funds are returned to the debtor because of a dismissal.""10 The
court reasoned that section 326(a) "was meant to exclude the recov-
ery of compensation to the trustee only on exempt property returned
to the debtor."' Here the returned funds were not exempt.
Moreover, there were no unsecured claims to satisfy. Accordingly,
"[w]here there is a surplus estate, generated by the efforts of the
trustee but not claimed because creditors have not filed proofs of
claim, it would be unfair to reward the debtor and not compensate
the trustee [after dismissal of the case]. '"11' The debtor agreed to
pay a fee to the trustee in an amount that exceeded the statutory
maximum allowed by section 326(a).113 By holding section 326(a)
inapplicable, the court allowed compensation in excess of the statu-
tory amount to the trustee who invested time and effort in the ad-
ministration of the case.
B. Compensation For Exempt Property Returned to Debtor
The court in In re Myatt"4 went one step beyond In re Flying S
Land & Cattle. Myatt allowed compensation when the trustee re-
turned exempt property to the debtor."15 As the Myatt court pointed
1982).
107. Id. at 57.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 58; cf. In re Pray, 37 Bankr. 27 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1983) (Trustee was
awarded quantum meruit after debtors requested a voluntary dismissal and where trustee
did not liquidate any property.) In re Rennison, 13 Bankr. 951 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1981)(Court held section 326(a) inapplicable in voluntary dismissal cases where the only dis-
bursement is to the debtors).
111. In re Flying S Land & Cattle Co., Inc., 23 Bankr. at 57. "Under 541 the
debtor's exempt property becomes part of the estate. . . .The phrase 'excluding the
debtor' in 326(a) protects the debtor's exempt property from diminution because it is not
a base upon which compensation can be computed." Id. at 58.
112. Id. at 58.
113. Id. at 57.
114. 101 Bankr. 197 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1989).
115. Id. But see In re Flying S Land & Cattle Co. Inc., 23 Bankr. 56, 57 (Bankr.
C.D. Cal. 1982) (stating that "section 326(a) was meant to exclude the recovery of com-
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out:
There is great unfairness in having a trustee diligently take charge of assets
not claimed exempt and reduce the asset to cash, expending considerable
time, effort and expense in the process. Then when the cash would other-
wise be distributed to creditors, the debtor seeks to amend his exemptions to
claim the benefit of the trustee's work without bearing the burden of the
trustee's efforts.1 '
The debtor was allowed to amend his exemptions on the condition
that the trustee was paid.117 Consequently, some courts use their eq-
uitable powers to prevent the otherwise harsh results of a literal ap-
plication of section 326(a) even where exempt property is returned to
the debtor.
C. Analysis of the Equitable Approach
The trend in these cases is to award reasonable fees to trustees for
beneficial services performed on behalf of the estate even though no
moneys are disbursed. Awarding quantum meruit fees is consistent
with the section 330(a)(1) reasonable value standard. One court
noted that "when considering an award on equitable principles and
based on quantum meruit, the nature and the extent of the services
rendered by the trustee must obviously be examined." ' Similarly,
courts examine the nature and extent of the trustee's services in or-
der to award reasonable compensation under section 330(a)(1). It is
interesting that the same factors apply whether the courts are
awarding compensation on the basis of quantum meruit or according
to the reasonable value of services test under sectiori 330(a)(1).111
Both approaches recognize that the estate should compensate a
trustee's efforts when the trustee is employed to further the interests
of the estate. The court gives proper effect to Congress' intent under
section 330(a)(1) when it disregards the statutory language of sec-
pensation to the trustee only on exempt property returned to the debtor"); In re Dondey,
50 Bankr. 12 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1985) (Denying compensation after trustee had fully
administered estate but whole estate turned out to be exempt). The Dondey court noted
"that the harsh consequence of the literal application of 326(a) has led some courts...
to grant compensation to a trustee when the estate is returned to the debtor upon a
dismissal." Id. at 13. There was no "precedent for disregarding the plain language of the
statute with respect to that part of the estate which is exempt." Id.
116. In re Myatt, 101 Bankr. at 201 (quoting In re Salem, 7 Bankr. 889, 890
(Bankr. D.N.M. 1980).
117. Id. at 201.
118. Id.
119. But see In re Rennison, 13 Bankr. 951 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1981) (Court held
that trustee is entitled to statutory commission in case of voluntary dismissal). (Empha-
sis added).
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tion 326(a) and allows compensation to the trustee for valuable ser-
vices performed. Otherwise, the trustee will act as "an unpaid collec-
tion agent for the debtor."' 20 These cases illustrate why section
326(a) should be repealed.
The equitable approach yields a result consistent with the goals of
bankruptcy law. Trustees are rewarded for diligently beginning their
work and acting to protect the interests of unsecured creditors. The
debtor's property is collected and reduced to cash. In addition, settle-
ments are encouraged. Therefore, the equitable approach encourages
efficient case administration.
However, there remains the question of whether bankruptcy courts
have authority to disregard statutory language when it is unambigu-
ous.12' "Legislative history can be a legitimate guide to a statutory
purpose obscured by ambiguity, but in the absence of a clearly ex-
pressed legislative intention to the contrary, the language of the stat-
ute itself "must ordinarily be regarded as conclusive.' "'1122 Accord-
ing to one leading commentator, "equitable powers [were] to be
exercised within the limits laid down by the [Bankruptcy] Act and
subject to and consistent with any specific provisions contained in
it."'123
The legislative history of section 326(a) does not suggest that
courts are authorized to use their equitable powers to award trustee
fees when statutory requirements are not met.'24 Actually, the dis-
cretionary $150 fee allowed under the Act was eliminated under the
Code. " That implies Congress' disfavored judicial discretion in the
trustee compensation area and preferred that judges work within the
statutory scheme.
In addition, a problem arises as to when equitable powers should
be exercised. Although case law is developing, the standards are in-
consistently applied. The results suggest that it may depend upon the
judge's point of view. Equitable results have been allowed in cases
where no moneys have been disbursed to unsecured creditors. Yet,
the equitable approach cannot be relied upon as a tool to further the
goal of promoting efficient case administration under the Code.
120. Id. at 953.
121. See generally Klee & Merola, Ignoring Congressional Intent: Eight Years of
Judicial Legislation, 62 At. BANKR. L. J. (1988) (discussing judicial legislation under
the Bankruptcy Code in areas other than trustee compensation).
122. Cavazos v. Simmons, 90 Bankr. 234, 239 (Bankr. N.D. Tx. 1988) (citing
Burlington Northern Railroad Co. v. Oklahoma Tax Commission, 481 U.S. 454 (1987)).
123. 1 W. COLLIER, supra note 14, T 2.09. (footnotes omitted) (citing SEC v.
United States Realty & Improvement Co., 310 U.S. 434 (1940); cf. Mobil Oil Corp. v
Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618, 625 (1978) ("There is a basic difference between filling a
gap left by Congress' silence and rewriting rules that Congress has affirmatively and
specifically enacted.").
124. H.R. REP., supra note 25, at 327.
125. 2 W. COLLIER, supra note 14, 326.01(3).
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There should be other statutory authority before the courts disregard
the unambiguous statutory language under section 326(a) in order to
further the marketplace approach policy espoused under section
330(a)(1).
D. Interpreting the Statutory Mandate that Moneys be
Disbursed: The Theory of Constructive Disbursement
Absent those limited situations which compel some courts to in-
voke their equitable powers, the courts must struggle to award fair
compensation within the boundaries of the statutory scheme. While
staying within the confines of section 326(a), a court attempts to
determine a reasonable fee according to the guidelines set forth
under section 330(a)(1). The statutory language of section 326(a)
that compensation be determined according to moneys actually paid
or turned over to creditors complicates the court's assignment of de-
termining fees. There is a split of authority regarding whether any
liquid assets other than cash can be considered as moneys
disbursed.' 26
Some courts allow compensation to be computed on the basis of
property turned over. 127 Compensation is allowed on the theory that
turning over property is a constructive disbursement of moneys to
the creditors. However, other courts hold that "when the statute says
money disbursed or turned over, it means money, and not
property."' 28
126. Id.
127. In re Greenley, 102 Bankr. 400 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1989). The court held that
"guaranteed contracts have been constructively disbursed to the creditors" and therefore
"qualify as being money turned over to the estate upon which the trustee's commission
may be based. . . ." Id. at 405; see also In re Toole, 294 F. 975 (S.D.N.Y. 1920)
(Court held that the words "or turned over" were sufficient to include property at value
received, as well as "moneys disbursed.").
128. In re Morris Bros., 8 F.2d 629, 630 (D. Ore. 1925) (The court held that
commissions are determined according to "moneys disbursed to creditors" and not on
property turned over. This is consistent with "the plain and unambiguous meaning of the
statute."); see also In re New England Fish Co., 34 Bankr. 899, 902 (Bankr. W.D. Wa.
1983) (The court concluded that "trustee's compensation must be based (n actual mon-
ies disbursed to parties in interest, and not on assets or settlements which can be con-
strued as a constructive disbursement." The court noted that even if the "trustee's efforts
deserve compensation in excess of the maximum allowable under the law, the solution is
not with the Court but with Congress."); In re Brigantine Beach Hotel Corp., 197 F.2d
296, 299 (3d Cir. 1952) (Court held debtor's principal asset that was returned to debtor
could not be used as a basis on which to calculate compensation. The court reasoning
that the term "moneys" is not the equivalent of property), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 832
(1952).
1011
1. The Greenley Case
In In re Greenley, the bankruptcy court reduced the trustee's fee
after holding that future income generated under negotiated con-
tracts could not be considered as disbursements to the creditors.1 29 In
Greenley, "[t]he debtor, whose principal business was reprocessing
coal refuse, accumulated four large waste coal or 'gob' piles."' 130
When "prices of competitive fuels declined in the early 1980s ...
the main asset, the 'gob' piles, came to be viewed more as an envi-
ronmental hazard and an eyesore than as valuable property." 131
The trustee arranged several contracts between the debtor and a
newly formed power company "whereby the debtor would supply its
coal refuse. . . on a long term basis."' 32 The contracts would gener-
ate over twenty eight million dollars.133 The contracts were included
in a plan that was backed and later confirmed by the creditors and
shareholders. 34 Subsequently, the trustee submitted an application
seeking $362,500 by using the value of the contracts as a basis upon
which to calculate his commission." 5
The court felt compelled to review "what appeared to be a very
large commission," despite creditor support.136 Moreover, "[c]ounsel
for a large creditor . . . vigorously support[ed] the application" at
the fee hearing.' 37 Yet, the court reduced the commission to
$53,594.138
The court held that the trustee was not entitled to commissions
after confirmation of the plan because "section 326(a) expressly ex-
cludes consideration of disbursements to the debtor.'1 3  The court
noted that "[e]ntry of the order confirming the [p]lan 'vests all of
the property of the estate in the debtor.' "'40 Thus, the court con-
cluded that anticipated profits under the agreements were "turned
over to the debtor by the Trustee.' 4'
The court also held "that compensation is limited to only those
funds actually disbursed or paid over. ' 142 Negotiated contracts an-







136. Id. at 856.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 855.
139. Id. at 859; cf. In re Flying S Land & Cattle Co., Inc., 23 Bankr. 56 (Bankr.
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ticipating future income could not be considered as moneys dis-
bursed or turned over because of valuation problems. 4 ' Unfortu-
nately, under this view the trustee went uncompensated for his
ingenuity and negotiation skills despite enormous benefits to the es-
tate. Section 326(a) interfered with this court's approach to award-
ing a fair fee for beneficial services performed by the trustee. Conse-
quently, the estate was unjustly enriched in light of the
disproportional benefit conferred compared to the trustee's
compensation.
The bankruptcy court was reversed on appeal." The district court
held that "[t]he guaranteed contracts have been constructively dis-
bursed to the creditors" and therefore "qualify as being money
turned over to the estate upon which the trustee's commissions may
be based." ' The court noted that the creditors and shareholders
were "perhaps in the best position to judge the reasonableness of the
fees."' 48 According to the reviewing court, requiring trustees to dis-
burse money before receiving their fees would cause "perverse incen-
tives" inconsistent with "the basic goals underlying bankruptcy law,
that is, the protection of creditors and successful reorganization of
the debtor.' 47 The court noted that "[t]he trustee could have put
[the business] up for sale, obtained cash, then passed it onto credi-
tors."'1 48 Thus, the bankruptcy court's narrow interpretations of sec-
tion 326(a) could motivate other trustees to devise optimum cash
payout reorganization plans. 49 Immediate sales will be favored over
valuable "long term contracts."'' 10
Finally, the court reasoned that the trustee "created new property,
the guaranteed contracts," from which the "creditors and stockhold-
ers have obtained the benefits."'' S The contracts were valued at
"their present value because this is the amount which is . . .being
constructively turned over."' 52 The district court held the fee re-
143. Id. at 860; see In re Lehenkrauss, 16 F. Supp. 792, 794 (E.D.N.Y. 1936)
(The Lehenkrauss court held that "[i]f in appropriate circumstances, the transfer of
property may be regarded as the equivalent of turning over money ... the requirement
of equivalence cannot be met, in the absence of proof of the value of the property
transferred.").
144. Greenley, 102 Bankr. 400, 407 (E.D. Pa. 1989).
145. Id. at 405.
146. Id. at 406.





152. Id. at 405.
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quested by the trustee was reasonable and awarded the full amount.
2. Analysis of the Constructive Disbursement Theory
The theory of constructive disbursement allows the court to cir-
cumvent the literal language of section 326(a) and award fair com-
pensation after a trustee performs beneficial services for the estate.
This gives effect to Congress' intent to compensate trustees at com-
petitive rates for work performed. Moreover, higher pay invites supe-
rior performances and encourages trustees to think of productive
"imaginative resolutions [for] problems posed by estates which they
are managing."' 53 Trustees are encouraged to be creative in saving a
business undergoing reorganization. "This translates into thousands
of jobs saved, reduction of creditor losses, and increased economic
health."'54
Awarding compensation strictly according to the statutory man-
date that moneys be disbursed encourages optimum cash pay out
plans and discourages qualified individuals from serving as trustees.
Such a result is incompatible with the purpose of maximizing credi-
tor claims through efficient case administration. The theory of con-
structive disbursement allows the court to award competitive fees
thereby retaining competent bankruptcy professionals who can effec-
tively administer cases.
On the other hand, the constructive disbursement theory is an in-
effective tool to further the goal of promoting efficient case adminis-
tration. While some courts utilize this approach, others do not. Reli-
ance on judicial discretion produces inconsistent results. The cases
demonstrate that trustees are often forced to resort to an appeal
where courts requiring moneys to be disbursed to creditors unfairly
determine their compensation according to the statutory mandates of
section 326(a). Utilizing the theory of constructive disbursement can
aid the bankruptcy court in awarding competitive fees to prevent fu-
ture fee disputes that contribute to judicial backlogs.
Further, Congress could have included properties turned over as
well as moneys as the basis on which commissions are to be com-
puted when it enacted the Code. Although valuation problems exist,
the burden of proof is on the trustee. The statutory mandate that
fees should be awarded for beneficial and necessary services per-
formed on behalf of the estate provides additional guidance for the
courts. In the absence of other statutory reform, a compelling argu-
ment can be made that Congress should amend section 326(a) to
include the language "upon property and moneys disbursed or
turned over in the case" in order to bring consistency, predictability
153. Greenley, 94 Bankr. at 860.
154. T. Stanton, supra note 78, at 94.
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and fairness to trustee compensation.
IV. SOLUTIONS
A. Repeal Section 326(a)
The most obvious solution is to repeal section 326(a). It appears
that the statutory limitation no longer serves the original purpose
intended by Congress. The commission scheme does not promote dil-
igent and efficient work. Section 326(a) deters the trustee from per-
forming valuable services for the estate other than the distributi6n of
moneys. A "get in and get out" attitude as well as misplaced incen-
tives may develop, especially in reorganization cases. There is little
encouragement to salvage assets and maximize returns under the
current scheme.
Furthermore, section 326(a) may actually serve to increase estate
expenses because it does not apply to other professionals involved in
estate administration. Indeed, one bankruptcy judge noted after re-
viewing a trustee's expense report: "[T]rustees are receiving so little
pay, that where previously they handled most matters themselves
(almost all are attorneys), now there is more of a tendency to employ
attorneys . . . usually themselves.' 55 Hence, the commission
scheme cannot serve to maximize creditor returns when increased
expenses are charged to the estate.
Finally, the United States trustee system has rectified case admin-
istration problems that developed under the Act. The system
"serve[s] as [a] bankruptcy watchdog to prevent fraud, dishonesty
and overreaching in the bankruptcy system."' 5 In fact, "there are
twice as many successful Chapter 11 reorganizations in districts
where a United States trustee is in place.' 157 There is also "en-
sure[d] increased integrity and financial controls in Chapter 7 case
administration."' 58 The Office of the United States Trustee should
continue to play an important role in case administration, diminish-
ing the need for the statutory mandates of section 326(a).
Absent section 326(a), the courts could award reasonable compen-
sation to trustees and other professionals according to the standards
set forth in section 330(a)(1). The "reasonable value of services" test
155. In re Marsh, 5 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d (MB) 106, 108 (Bankr. E.D. Va.
1981).
156. T. Stanton, supra note 78, at 91.
157. Id. at 94.
158. Id. at 91.
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requires that all necessary and beneficial services performed on be-
half of the estate should be compensated. Although requiring a sub-
jective analysis by the court, such a scheme lends more predictability
to trustee fee awards. In addition, efficient, creative and expedient
case administration will be encouraged when competitive fees are
awarded. All professionals hired to advance the interests of the es-
tate will be compensated according to similar standards, encouraging
those qualified to do the work themselves. With reduced expenses,
increased returns to creditors would become a reality. Using the con-
sistent "reasonable value" standard provides a less complicated ap-
proach for the court when it determines trustee fees.
B. New Legislation
In the absence of repeal, Congress should amend the present stat-
utory scheme to authorize quantum meruit compensation in appro-
priate cases under section 326(a). Additionally, section 326(a) could
be amended to allow property turned over to be used as a basis for
calculating trustee fees. These amendments would lend financial cer-
tainty, fairness and predictability to the current scheme. The trustee
who diligently begins to administer the estate will be rewarded.
Another alternative would be to enact a new standard for Chapter
11 reorganization trustees. The current scheme would continue in
effect for Chapter 7 cases. Chapter 11 cases are usually more com-
plex and raise more financial uncertainties for creditors than a
Chapter 7 liquidation case. As one commentator noted, "[t]here is a
substantial amount of. . . work that becomes necessary, much of it
creative, imaginative and of a very high quality."'"9 Thus, a different
standard is warranted for Chapter 11 trustees.
Compensation for Chapter 11 trustees should not be capped or
tied to money distribution. With successful reorganization comes
"thousands of jobs saved, reduction of creditor losses, and increased
economic health." 160 Because reorganization cases have the most po-
tential for positive and far reaching social and economic benefits,
trustees should be paid pursuant to standards that recognize those
benefits.
CONCLUSION
Courts have struggled to balance the competing interests behind
sections 326(a) and 330(a)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code. Left unan-
swered is the question of the effectiveness of the statutory limitation
of section 326(a) in promoting efficient case administration. Trustees
159. Lavien, supra note 14.
160. T. Stanton, supra note 78, at 94.
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working in a prompt manner to maintain and collect assets, settle
claims and disburse moneys as soon as possible are needed to run the
bankruptcy system efficiently. The increased number of bankruptcies
since the enactment of the Code underscores the need to attract and
retain competent trustees. Indeed, one court noted "[r]easonable
compensation for trustees is not only just, it is essential to the main-
tenance of the system.' 6 '
Reasonable payment, in light of the economic realities, is impera-
tive to attract such competent trustees - the backbone of'an effi-
cient system. The increased number of bankruptcies has far reaching
economic and social effects. These effects need to be considered
when evaluating the proper amount of compensation for trustees. In
particular, these effects should play an important role when award-
ing compensation in the context of a reorganization case. Salvaged
businesses represent employment and boost this country's fiscal well
being.
The bankruptcy system as it exists today cannot expect to convert
assets of a debtor at substantially lower rates than would be afforded
creditors who resort to individual remedies. Individual remedies may
consume vast amounts of time and expense with little or no chance
of receiving a return. The advantage of bankruptcy is that it offers
greater chances for return especially when estates are administered
in a timely and effective manner. New statutory provisions regarding
trustee compensation are needed. Congress must act in this regard to
"fine tune" the Code so that competent trustees continue to serve.
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